person to whom it is granted from all consequential disabilities of judgment and restores him to his prior rights. *Wood v. Fitzgerald,* 3 Or. 568; *State v. Foley,* 15 Nev. 64. The only exception to this is that a full pardon cannot restore to the recipient any rights or interests which have become vested in others in consequence of the judgment. *Ex parte Garland,* 71 U. S. 333. From this some text writers have reasoned to the conclusion set forth by this case. *Schouler's Husband and Wife,* 554.

EASEMENTS—PARTY WALLS.—JACKSON V. BRUNS, 106 NORTHWESTERN 1.—*Held,* that the owner of the second story of a building has no equitable right to compel the owner of the first story to keep the foundation and walls of the first story in repair for the purpose of furnishing continuing support to the second story in the absence of any express or implied contract on the part of the owner of the first story to do so.

EVIDENCE—OPINION EVIDENCE—QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS.—MANHATTAN DELIVERY CO. V. SIMON, 98 N. Y. SUPP. 844.—*Held,* it was error to permit a witness to testify as to the value of certain work done on garments, without having previously qualified himself as competent to so testify.

Although opinions of witnesses are to be excluded except upon questions of science and skill, as to which they have been specially educated, yet a witness may give estimates and opinions on questions of value. *Willis v. McCarn,* 33 Barber, 115. The general rule is to the contrary, however, and a witness must first qualify before he can testify as to opinion of value of certain articles. *Gregory v. Fichter,* 14 N. Y. Supp. 891. Where an article has no market value, its value may be shown by opinions of witnesses properly informed as to things of a similar nature. *Sullivan v. Lear,* 23 Fla. 463. Opinions respecting value of property are incompetent when witnesses fail to show a sufficient general knowledge of the subject-matter, *Haight v. Kimbark,* 51 Ia. 13. But the objection cannot be urged where an opportunity for cross-examination has been given. *Klotz v. James,* 96 Ia. 1.

EVIDENCE—REGULATIONS OF DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT—JUDICIAL NOTICE.—STATE V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., 54 S. E. 295 (N. C.).—*Held,* the courts will take judicial notice of the rules and regulations adopted by the United States Department of Agriculture, concerning cattle transportation, and applicable within the state.

Courts should take judicial notice of what ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction. *Gordon v. Tweedy,* 74 Ala. 238. In the early cases there was a tendency to refuse to take judicial notice of the regulations of the executive departments. So in 1857, the courts of California refused to take judicial notice of the rules of department of the Interior. *Hensley v. Tarkey,* 7 Cal. 288. Similarly in regard to regulations of Treasury Department. *Moore v. Worthington,* 63 Ky. 307. Now it is generally recognized that the rules and regulations of one of the departments of government, established in accordance with statute, have the force of law, *Gratiot v. U. S.,* 4 How. 80; and courts take judicial notice of them. *Long v. Hanson,* 72 Me. 104. Hence, the courts of Montana will take judicial notice of the rules and regulations of the Department of the Interior. *U. S. v. Williams,* 6 Mont. 379. Federal courts take judicial notice of administrative regulations of considerable notoriety, including the rules of Federal executive departments. *Dominici v. U. S.,* 72 Fed. 46.